

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

Referring to an earlier conversation, Mr. Nitze first asked Mr. Stikker to discuss further his feeling that he was not receiving sufficient political and military information to enable him to perform his duties to Secretary General properly . Mr. Stikker stated that he had not intended to complain, but he felt that if he received more information he could do a better job. He learned that, as Secretary General , he received much less information than he had received when he had been Netherlands' Permanent Representative. Routine distribution of NATO military documents, for example, was made to delegations concerned but not to the international staff. He had discussed this matter with the Standing Group, and some improvement has been noted. He also feels a need for two additional types of information. First, there is political information of world wide interest (Cuba and Laos, for example) which might come before the NAC in the future, on which he should be current. He had discussed this with Secretary Rusk, who had promised him that such information should be relayed to him through Ambassador Finletter for his personal background information only. Second, there is certain Defense information, such as that sent to Mr. Levy, on which it would be helpful if he could be informed on a personal background basis. Ambassador Finletter suggested that copies of such messages could be given Mr. Stikker for his personal information. Mr. Nitze stated that the normal communications between his office and Mr. Levy would not be appropriate for transmission to Mr. Stikker, since these covered many operational matters which would not be of interest to Mr. Stikker. However, there might be certain matters on which Mr. Stikker could be informed. He would look into the matter to see if there were any way in which Defense might help.

Mr. Stikker then mentioned his discussion with General Lemnitzer about the U.S. view on NATO strategy. As he sees it, the big problem is how to achieve the proper balance between nuclear and conventional capabilities.

27 June 1964


SUBJECT: Mr. Wilkie's Meeting with NATO Secretary General Stikker

Others present: Ambassador Finletter
Mr. St. Louis, Chief de Cabinet to Mr. Stikker
Mr. Magill, State
Col. Eaton, USA

Referring to an earlier conversation, Mr. Nitz first asked Mr. Stikher to discuss further his feeling that he was not receiving sufficient political and military information to enable him to perform his duties as Secretary General properly. Mr. Stikher stated that he had not intended to complain, but he felt that if he received more information he could do a better job. He had learned that, as Secretary General, he received much less information than he had received when he had been Netherlands' Permanent Representative. Routine distribution of NATO military documents, for example, was made to Delegations concerned but not to the International Staff. He had discussed this matter with the Standing Group, and some improvement has been noted. He also feels a need for two additional types of information. First, there is political information of world wide interest (Cuba and Laos, for example) which might come before the SAC in the future, on which he should be current. He had discussed this with Secretary Rumb, who had promised him that such information could be relayed to him through Ambassador Finletter for his personal background information only. Second, there is certain Defense information, such as that sent to Mr. Levy, on which it would be helpful if he could be informed on a personal background basis. Ambassador Finletter suggested that copies of such messages could be given Mr. Stikher for his personal information. Mr. Nitz stated that the normal communications between his office and Mr. Levy would not be appropriate for transmission to Mr. Stikher, since these covered many operational matters which would not be of interest to Mr. Stikher. However, there might be certain matters on which Mr. Stikher could be informed. He would look into the matter to see if there were any way in which Defense might help.

Mr. Stikker then mentioned his discussion with General Lemaitre about the U.S. views on NATO strategy. As he sees it, the key problem is how to achieve the proper balance between nuclear and conventional capabilities.

UNCLASSIFIED



PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

Mr. Stikker then mentioned his discussions with General Lemnitzer about the U.S. views on NATO strategy. As he sees it, the key problem is how to achieve the proper balance between nuclear and conventional capabilities. He agrees with the U.S. view that conventional capabilities should be increased, but feels that only Germany, France (after settlement of the Algerian problem) and possibly Italy are in a position to increase their defense expenditures. At the same time, there is a continuing requirement for nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe.

Mr. Nitze then expressed his disagreement with the UK view that any substantial increase in conventional capability would serve to degrade the nuclear deterrent. While recognizing that there are political and economic limitations involved, increased conventional capabilities will grow to fill the middle ground, in between the all out nuclear response and no reaction. Accordingly, this will increase, rather than degrade, the overall deterrent. He pointed out that in the early nuclear days, we had been accused of "itching" to use SAC, and while this had changed, we must also have the will and determination to respond in this middle ground. We should have forces that are appropriate to the situation which exist today, so as to be able to "make the lesser decisions which may lead to the big decision".

After reiterating his agreement with the necessity for increased conventional capabilities, Mr. Stikker returned to the responsibilities for increased contributions. He expressed the view that there is no possibility that the UK will do more, because of her unwillingness to face the problem of conscription. He stated, however, that Berlin may require the UK to face the issue of conscription now. Ambassador Finletter noted that reinstitution of conscription in the UK would serve as an adjunct to other actions, but would not immediately affect the Berlin situation. Mr. Nitze expressed the view that such a step would have immediate effect on Khrushchev's judgement and would therefore help postpone a crisis over Berlin; the longer the crisis is postponed, the greater our overall military effort could be increased. Mr. Stikker pointed out that considerable time would be required for legislation to be enacted and for people to be called up and trained, and asked if the U.S. had any plans for immediate mobilization or buildup of its forces. Mr. Nitze then pointed out that the problem of Berlin had first been posed as six months ultimatum and this period had already been extended to 30 months, and that we should do whatever offers a sound basis to increase our overall capability with time.

Mr. Nitze stated that, if we are prepared for nuclear war, the corollary is that we should be prepared for lesser things, the alternative is accommodation to the Russian intentions, for example, a free city of West Berlin, which is not acceptable to Europe. Mr. Stikker stated that Berlin must be fitted into our action as early as possible, but suggested that this problem is

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

[same page]

separate from the basic long term problem of NATO strategy. Mr. Nitze replied that some of the considerations governing Berlin planning also relate to other possible situations of limited hostilities. We should do everything to enhance our overall position; he cited improvement of our nuclear deterrent by increasing the survivability of our weapons systems so as to reduce the value of a surprise attack; the necessity to overcome the problem of obsolescence, which is already with us, and the advantage of warning and dispersal.

Mr. Stikker then mentioned his discussion with General Lemaitre about the U.S. views on NATO strategy. As he sees it, the key problem is how to achieve the proper balance between nuclear and conventional capabilities. He agrees with the U.S. view that conventional capabilities should be increased, but feels that only Germany, France (after settlement of the Algerian problem) and possibly Italy are in a position to increase their defense expenditures. At the same time, there is a continuing requirement for nuclear weapons on the Continent of Europe.

Mr. Nitze then expressed his disagreement with the UK view that any substantial increase in conventional capability would serve to degrade the nuclear deterrent. While recognizing that there are political and economic limitations involved, increased conventional capabilities will serve to fill the middle ground, in between the all out nuclear response and no reaction. Accordingly, this will increase, rather than degrade, the overall deterrent. He pointed out that in the early nuclear days, we had been accused of "leaning" to use SAC, and while this has changed, we must also have the will and determination to respond in this middle ground. We should have forces that are appropriate to the situation which exists today, so as to be able to "make the lesser decisions which may lead to the big decision."

After reiterating his agreement with the necessity for increased conventional capabilities, Mr. Stikker returned to the possibility for increased contributions. He expressed the view that there is no possibility that the UK will do more, because of her unwillingness to face the problem of conscription. He stated, however, that Berlin may require the UK to face the issue of conscription now. Ambassador Fialletti noted that reinstitution of conscription in the UK would serve as an adjunct to other actions, but would not immediately affect the Berlin situation. Mr. Nitze expressed the view that such a step would have immediate effect on Khrushchev's judgment and would therefore help postpone a crisis over Berlin; the longer the crisis is postponed, the greater our overall military effort could be increased. Mr. Stikker pointed out that considerable time would be required for legislation to be enacted and for people to be called up and trained, and asked if the U.S. had any plans for immediate mobilization or buildup of its forces. Mr. Nitze then pointed out that the problem of Berlin had first been posed as six months ultimatum and this period had already been extended to 30 months, and that we should do whatever offers a sound basis to increase our overall capability with time.

Mr. Nitze stated that, if we are prepared for nuclear war, the corollary is that we should be prepared for lesser things; the alternative is accommodation to the Russian intentions, for example, a free city of West Berlin, which is not acceptable to Europe. Mr. Stikker stated that Berlin must be fitted into our action as early as possible, but suggested that this problem is separate from the basic long term problem of NATO strategy. Mr. Nitze replied that some of the considerations governing Berlin planning also relate to other possible situations of limited hostilities. We should do everything feasible to enhance our overall position; he cited improvement of our nuclear deterrent by increasing the survivability of our weapons systems so as to reduce the value of a surprise attack; the necessity to overcome the problem of obsolescence, which is already with us; and the advantages of warning and dispersal.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

Electrostatic reproduction made by the Eisenhower Library for preservation purposes.

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

Mr. Nitze then discussed the advantages and disadvantages of several different approaches to the MRBM problem. We favor a sea based missile, which, because of its relative invulnerability, has a much greater deterrent value than a land based weapon. Land based systems, such as MACE's which are fired, and vulnerable, do not face the Soviet with a second strike capability which they must be prepared to absorb. A mobile land based MRBM such as that proposed by General Norstad would have greater survivability, and has other obvious virtues, at the same time it present certain hazards. [3 lines excised]

expressed his own preference for sea-borne MRBMs.

Mr. Stikker

Mr. Stikker reverted to the question of how to obtain defense efforts, and gave his analysis of possibilities: the French (after Algeria) and the Germans are most capable of greater efforts; [words excised] the Dutch might be able to compensate for the reduction in US aid, but would do us no more; [words excised]; perhaps Italy could do more eventually. Mr. Nitze referred to his conversation with Norwegian Defense Minister Harlan, [words excised]

Mr. Nitze added that the requirements are not limited to resources; that France could make a significant contribution by cooperating in the to NATO Atomic stockpile program and by joining in the coordinated air defense system.

At this point, M. St. Mleux expressed the view that France would certainly make its airfields available in case of a crisis over Berlin, but not in any other cases; he added that there was no hope for change in other problem in the basic French position on nuclear weapons. Mr. Stikker expressed his agreement. Mr. Nitze then stated that this is a long term problem, and that we should not give up hope for a solution. M. St Mleux stated that some "new gesture" on the part of the US is required, perhaps in assistance toward developing a French Missile (delivery vehicle, not warhead), perhaps in providing French greater atomic information. Mr. Nitze observed that the US would be prepared to explore comparable moves if de Gaulle would change his attitude towards NATO; surely de Gaulle must realize that the force de frappe will be of little military value, even though he believes it would have some political worth. Referring to de Gaulle's views on national versus integrated defense, Mr. Nitze pointed out that what de Gaulle interpreted as disloyalty on the part of the French generals who held out for full participation in NATO was understood by others to be recognition of the fact that there is really no such thing as complete national defense. M. St. Mleux replied that de Gaulle realized that France cannot defend itself and must depend on NATO, but a main concern is the favored position of the UK, the advantages it receives from having bomber command, and the joint Anglo-US targetting, Mr. Nitze expressed his belief that the UK would eventually be willing to commit its strategic forces to NATO, if France would

SECRET

-3-

Mr. Nitze then discussed the advantages and disadvantages of several different approaches to the attack problem. He favor a sea based missile, which, because of its relative invulnerability, has a much greater deterrent value than a land based weapon. Land based systems, such as PAC-3, which are fired, and vulnerable, do not face the Soviets with a second strike capability which they must be prepared to absorb. A mobile land based missile such as that proposed by General Harstad would have greater survivability, and has other obvious virtues; at the same time it presents certain hazards.

Mr. Stikker expressed his own preference for sea-borne missiles.

Mr. Stikker reverted to the question of how to obtain greater defense efforts, and gave his analysis of possibilities: the French (after Algeria) and the Germans are most capable of greater effort;

The Dutch might be able to compensate for the reduction in US aid, but would do so no more; perhaps Italy could do more eventually. Mr. Nitze referred to his conversation with Norwegian Defense Minister Harlan.

Mr. Nitze added that the requirements are not limited to resources; that France could make a significant contribution by cooperating in the NATO Atomic Stockpile program and by joining in the coordinated air defense system.

At this point, M. St. Aulaire expressed the view that France would certainly make its airfields available in case of a crisis over Berlin, but not in any other case; he added that there was no hope for a change in other problems in the basic French position on nuclear weapons. Mr. Stikker expressed his agreement. Mr. Nitze then stated that this is a long term problem, and that he should not give up hope for a solution. M. St. Aulaire stated that some "new gesture" on the part of the US is required, perhaps in assistance toward developing a French missile (delivery vehicle, not warhead), perhaps in providing French greater atomic information. Mr. Nitze observed that the US would be prepared to explore considerable moves if de Gaulle would change his attitude toward NATO; surely de Gaulle must realize that the forces de France will be of little military value, even though he believes it would have some political worth. Referring to de Gaulle's views on national versus integrated defense, Mr. Nitze pointed out that what de Gaulle interpreted as disloyalty on the part of the French generals who held out for full participation in NATO was understood by others to be recognition of the fact that there is really no such thing as complete national defense. M. St. Aulaire replied that de Gaulle realizes that France cannot defend itself and must depend on NATO, but a main concern is the favored position of the UK; the advantage it receives from having Baxter Command, and the joint Anglo-US targeting. Mr. Nitze expressed his belief that the UK would eventually be willing to commit its strategic forces to NATO, if France would

SECRET

CLASSIFIED

Electrostatic reproduction made by the Eisenhower Library for preservation purposes.

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

change its attitude toward NATO, and that we should not adopt the current French position outside the context of NATO.
[paragraph excised]

~~SECRET~~

-4-

change its attitude toward NATO, and that we should not accept the current French position as final. Mr. St. Pierre stated that he would write a special position outside the context of NATO.

G. K. RAYON
Colonel, USA
Deputy Director
European Region

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFIED

Electrostatic reproduction made
by the Eisenhower Library
preservation purposes.